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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
ITS ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
(DAVID DOUGLAS HOOPER) 
and 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
SOUTH SLATERVILLE 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11580 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The Respondent sued to condemn and acquire fee title 
to .25 of an acre of land for the north-south freeway west of 
Ogden City over Appellant's canal. The highway project was 
known as I-15-8(7)338 and the parcel of land is referred to 
as No. 15-8:77D:A. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on the 18th and 19th of December 
1968; before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge of the 
Second Judicial District, in and for Weber County, Utah with-
out a jury. The issues were the compensation due the appel-
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lant by reason of the taking of the land and the severance 
damage to the remaining land. 
The trial court gave the appellant $450 for the actual 
value of the land taken and gave nothing for severance dam-
age. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant asks that a new trial be granted on the 
question of severance damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Willard Canal runs north and south parallel to and 
about 300 feet east of where the freeway here involved was 
later built (T-102 & Exhibit P-1). Approximately one year 
before this condemnation suit was filed the appellant pur-
chased a strip of land 1630 feet long east and west and 2 rods 
wide north and south and constructed a concrete canal 12 
feet wide at the top by 2 feet at the bottom and 3 feet deep, 
with a 12 foot maintenance road along its south bank. (T-12, 
T-13, T-15, T-16). The road dead ended at the west side of the 
Willard Canal Right of Way on the east end of Appellant's 
canal (T-164, T-165, T-166). Appellant's water headgate was 
up in the Willard Canal-some 35 to 40 feet east across Wil-
lard Canal Property and up a steep 6 to 8 foot canal bank. 
(T-39, T-47, T-154-172-173). Before this freeway was built the 
appellant's irrigation co. was able to travel on its own land 
the entire 1630 feet along its cement canal for repair work 
and maintenance. To get to its Willard Canal headgate its 
people could drive along the canal road, park at the Willard 
Canal bank and walk 30 to 40 feet up the bank to the diver-
sion. To get power machinery to the headgate it was always 
necessary to travel up 12th Street to Wall then over to 17th 
Street and down along the Willard Canal bank to the head-
gate. 
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The freeway was built at right angles over the canal with 
a high bridge. Approximately 270 feet of the appellant's ca-
nal and road were spanned by the freeway bridge. (T-270.) 
When the respondent built the bridge over appellant's canal 
they allowed the slope coming down toward the canal from 
the south end of the bridge to be built and concreted out into 
the middle of appellant's canal road. Respondent took some 
71/2 feet of the road and left the canal company some 41/2 
feet to travel on. (T-19, T-35, T-36, T-89). This means that 
the appellant can travel and maintain its canal from the west 
end by truck and power equipment east to the freeway-over 
its 12 foot road-then under the freeway for 270 feet it has 
nothing but a 41/2 foot path. Then east of the freeway it still 
has its 12 foot maintenance road but can not get draglines 
or backhoes or other power equipment to it because of the 
freeway on the west and the Willard Canal property on the 
east. The appellant owns no right-by deed or use to bring 
its power equipment down off the Willard Canal bank to its 
12 foot maintenance road. It has the right to come along the 
Willard Canal bank to get to its headgate but not the right 
to get to its maintenance road. (T-163 to T-173). 
The appellant called Lou Wangsgard, a consultant civil 
engineer as a witness. (T-33). He testified that the respondents 
built its concrete slope out into appellant's canal road, thus 
preventing motor vehicle traffic along it. (T-35 to T-38). This 
has caused the appellant to travel an extra mile and one-half 
each way to check its headgate diversion on Wilalrd Canal. 
Each time they do this they have to back up four-tenths of a 
mile to 17th Street because the Willard Canal bank isn't wide 
enough to turn on. (T·38, T-39). Mr. Wangsgard testified that 
two means could be used to correct the State's error in the 
building of its slope. One way would be to cut the concrete 
slope back for 7112 feet and build a concrete retaining wall 
so that the present road could be used and the other would 
be to cover the canal and build a new road over it. (T-41). 
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The first method would cost $10,500 and the second method 
$9,000. (T-44). 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT 1 
THE LOWER COURT ERRORED IN APPLYING THE 
RULES OF LAW LAID DOWN IN THE CASE OF STATE 
ROAD COMMISSION VS. UTAH SUGAR COMPANY DBA-
IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY TO THE CASE AT HAND. 
A. IN THE SUGAR COMPANY CASE, PUBLIC POL-
ICY, NECESSITY FOR PROGRESS AND SAFETY REQUIR-
ED THAT THE FREEWAY BE BUILT IN THE APPROXI-
MATE LOCATION OF THE FORMER HIGHWAY. HERE NO 
SUCH REQUIREMENT EXISTED FOR THE TAKING OF AP-
PELLANT'S ROAD. A DIFFERENT RULE OF LAW SHOULD 
APPLY WHERE THE CONDEMNING BODY EXERCISES ITS 
PRIVILEG WITH A TOTAL DISREGARD FOR THE RIGHTS 
OF THE CITIZENS IT INCONVENIENCES AND WITH NO 
ATTENTION PAID TO PRIVATE INJURY. WHERE IN THE 
SUGAR COMPANY CASE THE STATE ACTED WITH PRU-
DENCE AND PLANNING AND IN THE BEST POSSIBLE 
AND SAFEST WAY FOR ALL CONCERNED. IN THIS CASE 
IT APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO INJURE THEM. 
B. IN THE SUGAR COMPANY CASE THE CANAL 
COMPANY WAS NOT PREVENTED FROM GETTING TO 
ANY PART OF ITS CANAL. IN THE CASE AT HAND THE 
APPELLANT IS BLOCKED FROM GETTING POWER EQUIP-
MENT TO THE EAST POINT OF ITS CANAL UNLESS IT 
ACQUIRES FROM THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION THE 
RIGHT TO TRAVEL ACROSS ITS LAND. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
The lower court decided this case strictly on the decision 
4 
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in the State Road Commission vs. Utah Sugar Company, dba 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company 22 Utah 2d77, 448P2d901. (Record 
on Appeal page 13). It errored in applying the rules of law laid 
down in the Utah Sugar Company case to the case at hand. 
The Sugar Company case cites and sets forth the pertinent 
statutes and cases governing general situations such as found 
there and in this case. To paraphrase or repeat them would 
be a waste. 
It appears clear under Utah law "that if the State needs 
land for a freeway then public policy and the necessity for 
progress require that the land owner suffer any inconven-
ience and extra expense caused by "round about travel." This 
is a harsh law as it applies to the individual whose land is 
taken but is undoubtedly offset by the benefit to the public. 
The lower court in the case here being appealed failed to 
note the differences in situation between the two cases. 
A. In the Sugar Company case its canals before the 
condemnation came up to the existing highway and the canal 
company men even then had to cross the fence and high-
way to get to their next segment of canal. The state had no 
choice but to widen the freeway and make it non-access. This 
did not alter the canal company's rights. It just caused them 
to travel a bit further on a safer road than they did before. 
No arbitrary, negligent, or rough shod attitude was appar-
ent on the part of the Road Commission. This is not true 
in the case at hand. The bridging over the appellant's canal 
and road way does them no harm and if this had been done 
properly and with only a slight amount of consideration for 
the land owner there would have been no problem. There 
is no reason shown at the trial, nor is there any reason or 
logic apparent now why the Respondent decided to build 
their slope protection down into the middle of the appellant's 
maintenance road. For some 270 feet under the bridge the 
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State placed slope fill and concrete some 71/2 feet onto the 
appellant's 12 foot road. (T-152). An engineer certainly would 
not be necessary to tell the State people that this would stop 
the canal people from properly working their canal and from 
getting from the west half of their canal to the east half of 
it. The State could have prevented the problem without dam-
age or inconvenience to the State by making its concrete 
slope a little steeper. Where it was to be a concrete slope 
there could have been no sluffing problem caused by the 
slight increase. Mr. Wangsgard, an engineer, testified that 
the slope could have been so poured as to preserve the ca-
nal company's road. (T-36). 
Here then is a different situation than the Sugar Com-
pany case. Here the State Road Commission by its arbitrary 
judgment and for no reason shown in the record elects to 
destroy the canal road and access to the east part of appel-
lant's canal. When the condemning body acts without need 
and without observing proper consideration for the land 
owner it should no longer be protected by the "Public Pol-
icy" rule. Utah statutes, Utah Code Annotated 78-34-3(5) 
and 78-34-2 provide that private land can be taken by the 
State but it must be "compatible with the greatest public 
good and the least private injury." Here neither one was 
shown to exist by the respondent. Little attention was paid 
to private injury. 
B. In the Sugar Company case the canal workers could 
still get to any point of their canal with their equipment. 
After the condemnation, they had to use the safer route along 
the freeway and couldn't cross the highway directly. In this 
case the appellant's workmen can drive up their canal road 
to the freeway, then they must leave all tractors, backhoes, 
draglines, and trucks and walk 270 feet under the bridge 
to get to the remainder of their canal and then the rest of 
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the way on foot. They can follow the same route to get to 
the headgate or diversion they have always used by going 
around and down 17th Street but this means they have to 
back out each time along the Willard Canal bank for some 
four-tenths of a mile. (T-39). In addition the appellant has 
no road or right-of-way to get from the Willard Canal down 
to their maintenance road some 40 feet to the west. (T-163 
to T-168, T-170, T-172, T-173, T-176). Their maintenance road 
is also lower in elevation than the Willard Canal bank road. 
The State witness testified that rights of way could be ob-
tained by appellant to get onto their maintenance road east 
of the freeway but the witnesses were speaking without per-
sonal knowledge and from hearsay. (T-91, T-93, T-94, T-145, 
T-148, T-153, T-158 to 159). 
Where the appellants can no longer get onto and use 
their canal and road east of the freeway without acquiring 
an access from some 3rd party then there is an actual taking 
of some of their property rights. It was error for the lower 
court to find that there was no damage to appellant's land 
caused by the severance. 
In Southern Pacific Company vs. Arthur 10 Utah 2d 306, 
352 P2d 693 the land owners owned land on each end of 
Promontory Point and had sheep grazing, watering and trail-
ing rights in and across Little Valley. The railroad condemn-
ed land in the valley to extract dirt and fill material and 
made it impossible for the sheep to cross naturally and drink 
where customary. To get them around the pits would take 
extra moving and driving. The court held there had been 
a damage to the land owners on each side of the valley. "The 
pits affected all of the owner's lands for grazing purposes 
and not just the operation of the particular acreages from 
which the sand and gravel was taken." (page 697). 
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POINT II 
If the appellant in part were cut off from the east 300 
to 400 feet of its canal by the freeway and had no access to 
it for its maintenance by power equipment then the appel-
lant suffered damages. (T-152 and Exhibit Dl). The appel-
lant gave testimony that it had no access from the east over 
the Willard Canal property. (T-163 to 168, T-170, to 172, T-
173, T-176). The lower court errored in allowing Respondent 
to use hearsay testimony to refute appellant's witnesses and 
exhibits. No Witness for Respondent testified of his own 
knowledge that appellant had a right-of-way from the S-P 
Roadway on the north or down over the Willard Canal prop-
erty from the east or that they had ever used such a way. 
(T-91, T-93, T-94, T-112 to 114, T-148, T-153, T-158, T-159). 
Except for the hearsay testimony improperly admitted, the 
evidence shows that the freeway blocked appellants from the 
use of their land east of the freeway. 
CONCLUSION 
The State's carelessness or inattention to details caused 
the appellant's roadway under the freeway bridge to be re-
duced from 12 feet to 41/2 feet-for a span of 270 feet-(the 
State placed a 16-foot gate on each side of the bridge so that 
the canal company could have access to its 41/2 foot wide road, 
indicating an engineering error in either the fence design or 
the concrete slope protection. Mr. Cook testified that the 
appellant would lose in damage because of the narrowing 
of its road the sum of $8,000 over the next 32 years. T-60). 
Mr. Wangsgard testified that it would cost the appellant $9,-
000 to pipe the canal under the freeway bridge and $10,500 
to cut back the concrete slope protection and build a retain-
ing wall to correct the State's narrowing of this canal main-
tenance road. (T-44). The total injury and loss of use of ap-
pellant's property was caused in the Respondent's failure to 
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use care and minimize private injury. Without the Respond-
ent's needless and autocratic act in electing to use the appel-
lant's canal road when it did not need to, there would have 
been no injury or continuing damage of the appellant. In this 
case an actual taking of appellant's ground, a segment of its 
road right in the middle of its canal property, has caused 
damage to its total canal property and has partially severed 
the canal property east of the bridge. 
Therefore, appellant asks that a new trial be awarded 
or, in the alternative, that appellant be awarded the cost of 
repairing the damage caused to its canal road. 
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